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ABSTRACT 
With the recent troubles in U.S. elections, there has been a 
nationwide push to update voting systems.   Municipalities 
are investing heavily in electronic voting systems, many of 
which use a touch screen.  These systems offer the promise 
of faster and more accurate voting, but the current reality is 
that they are fraught with usability and systemic problems.  
This paper surveys issues relating to usability of electronic 
voting systems and reports on a series of studies, including 
one with 415 voters using new systems that the State of 
Maryland purchased.  Our analysis shows these systems 
work well, but have several problems, and a significant 
minority of voters have concerns about them. 
Keywords 
Electronic voting systems, Direct Recording Electronic 
(DRE), voting usability. 
INTRODUCTION 
A major lesson derived from the 2000 presidential election 
in the U.S. is that the manner in which voters cast their 
ballots is important.  Voting technology and ballot design 
can influence election outcomes, affect how voters feel 
about their ability to exercise their right to vote, and 
influence voters’ willingness to accept the results of an 
election as legitimate.  It was also discovered that most 
polling places nationwide employ outdated technology, 
including unreliable punch-card ballots and mechanical 
lever machines, with only a third of the electorate using 
modern computerized technology, such as optical scanning 
systems or direct recording electronic (DRE) systems with 
ATM-style touch-screen voting [13][14].  And, because the 
poor and ethnic and racial minorities were more likely to 
cast their ballots on outdated systems, their votes were 
among the least likely to be counted.  
States have responded to the problems associated with the 
2000 elections by commissioning studies, revamping 
election administration, redesigning ballots, and, in some 
cases, by investing heavily in new voting equipment.  A 
major problem, however, is that there is little solid 
information about the interface between voters and various 
voting systems and ballots on which to base or evaluate the 
success of the massive reform and significant expenditures 
that are coming. 
Voting systems present a unique challenge to interface 
designers because of the nature of the social contract our 
(U.S.) society has for voting.  Unlike just about every other 
system in our society, voting systems must be usable by 
every citizen at least 18 years old.  This includes the 
elderly, disabled, uneducated, and poor users.  It also 
includes individuals who for whatever reason, have opted 
out of using electronic machinery – those who go into a 
bank and see a teller,  don’t scan their own groceries, and 
pay for gasoline with cash. 
The challenges are even harder because there is little or no 
training available for voters.  The first time most voters 
ever touch the voting system is the moment they vote.  And 
once they start voting, there is tremendous social pressure 
to do it without help.  With people watching, inadequately 
trained poll workers, busy people waiting on line, the social 
importance of voting, and the value placed on secrecy, 
voters may become anxious and afraid to ask for help. 
Finally, the systemic issues of how voting machines get 
purchased and evaluated are problematic as well.   State or 
county purchasers are usually more concerned about cost 
then usability.  And once the systems are purchased, the 
public has no access to the machines for evaluation.  
Election workers who design ballots tend not to have 
experience in usability and screen design. Poll workers who 
deploy the voting systems have minimal training to cope 
with the inevitable problems. 
Electronic voting systems offer promise as well – from the 
opportunity to change font size and language on demand, to 
offering disabled users customized access, to accurate and 
fast recording and tabulation of votes.  But there are many 
issues that add up to the risk that voters may become 
disenfranchised.  And this is especially true for the elderly 
and citizens at the margins of society. 
 
 
In this paper, we lay out the issues of electronic voting 
systems, report on a study we performed on new systems 
that the State of Maryland purchased, and make 
suggestions for improvements. 
SPECIALIZED VOTING CONCERNS 
The unusual requirements of voting systems bring special 
concerns related to support of all citizens in their access 
and trust of voting machines.  In addition, there are further 
concerns relating to the possible bias of ballot design, 
anonymity of voters, and validity of the recorded vote. 
Accessibility 
One of the largest issues related to DRE voting systems is 
accessibility.  For designers of computer programs, 
accessibility is  the easiest design factor to ignore.  Many 
classes of voters can easily be disenfranchised by a voting 
system that accommodates only “normal” users. 
The most obvious of these is disabled voters.  The federal 
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act 
(VAEHA), passed in 1984, mandates that polling places be 
available and usable by the elderly and handicapped [1]. 
Regardless, a study of polling place accessibility performed 
by the National Voter Independence Project in 1998 and 
2000 revealed that 47% of polling places had some type of 
accessibility problem [21]. 
According to the National Organization on Disability, DRE 
balloting systems are the most accessible technology, 
compared to lever, punch-card, optical scan, and hand-
count systems [3]. Nonetheless, there is considerable 
diversity among DRE products, and our own evaluation of 
Maryland’s voice-only system showed many problems. 
Age and Technical Experience 
In addition to general disabilities, the issue of “computer 
disability” can cause problems in DRE elections. Research 
suggests that older adults consistently perform more poorly 
than  younger adults in performing computer-based tasks.  
This is true both with respect to the amount of time 
required to perform the task, as well as the number of 
errors made [18].  This is likely due in part to a perception 
on the part of older adults that they might inadvertently 
damage the computer, or general uneasiness in using the 
technology. 
It may also be that a decrease in manual dexterity and in 
eye-hand coordination accounts for greater difficulty in 
operating such systems.  In one recent study, age was 
positively correlated with difficulty in performing tasks 
with a computer mouse [24]. Although popular DRE 
systems do not use a computer mouse, similar issues are 
present.  Older adults have greater difficulty in viewing a 
computer screen, and correct conceptualization of the 
relationship between screen or button manipulation and 
program activity may be a problem.  
VAEHA requires three types of accommodations: access, 
assistance, and instruction.  While these accommodations 
do not address the issue of ballot design, and the VAEHA 
does not apply to state elections, courts have used the 
criteria in the VAEHA to evaluate whether a state election 
complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act [2]. 
Bias 
Aside from accessibility, the issue of bias presents both a 
logistical and a legal problem for elections.  Actual ballot 
design is fairly contentious, in part, because candidates 
believe that their location on the ballot changes the 
likelihood that a voter will select them.  For example,  
candidates listed first on a ballot are generally favored [11].  
For this reason, many jurisdictions pre-select a designated 
balloting order; often, candidates are listed by party in a 
specified configuration, by lottery, or alphabetically. 
Electronic ballots cannot avoid these pitfalls for the same 
reason that paper ballots cannot; names on a ballot must be 
presented in some fashion.  Computers, of course, can 
randomize the presentation of names, but this creates 
difficulty for users who have pre-planned their voting.   
Although hardware maintenance is an issue with any 
technology, it becomes especially important with touch 
screen voting systems.  With repeated use, touch screens 
can wear out.  In particular, problems can develop with 
localized sensitivity.  This means that, if the equipment is 
not properly maintained and replaced, it could physically 
become more difficult to vote for a popular candidate than 
to vote for an unpopular one.  Part of the standard for any 
electronic voting technology must be regular equipment 
maintenance schedules that avoid such overuse problems.  
Accountability and Verifiability 
Traditionally, votes were cast on paper and counted by 
hand. Voters were confident that the marks they made on 
ballots reflected their intended vote. Voting machines that 
used levers and punch card systems also provided voters 
with a high degree of confidence that they cast their votes 
as intended. Until the 2000 elections voters also routinely 
assumed their votes were properly counted. Because they 
are paperless, DRE systems raise the question: how can one 
know that when a voter chooses a particular candidate on 
the screen, a vote for that candidate is recorded? 
The most pressing verifiability problem with the use of 
computerized voting is that the systems are provided by 
private companies, and the government usually has no 
oversight into the production of the systems beyond 
choosing whether or not to use them.  It is easy to imagine 
a scenario whereby a malicious, or simply a careless, 
programmer sets up a situation in which votes for 
Candidate A appear to go to Candidate A as far as the 
user’s display, but actually are tabulated for Candidate B.  
More critically, suppose that the same situation occurred, 
but only with a small percentage of the votes cast. The use 
of a DRE system in this case would be catastrophic, 
because there would be no way to review voting records to 
conduct a recount.  With paper ballots, voters can visually 
inspect the official record, but with computer-based voting 
this is next to impossible. 
 
A simple solution to this problem is to provide the user 
with a printed record of the votes electronically recorded.  
Before leaving the polling place, the voter would be 
required to certify the contents of the paper record and 
place it into a ballot box.  The printed records could then be 
manually counted in the event of a challenge, and this 
procedure would foil any attempt at falsifying votes 
internally to the voting system.  This approach, however, 
has not been implemented in any commercial systems that 
we are aware of. 
EXISTING SYSTEMS 
Many DRE systems are available today, and it is not 
always easy to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
each product.  Some are quite attractive, yet they suffer 
from major usability problems.  More than ever, system 
evaluators need to become accustomed to thinking in terms 
of usability, and especially usability for elderly and 
disabled voters.   
We briefly describe here some of the major systems 
available in the marketplace today to give a sense of what 
is currently being used. 
Diebold AccuVote-TS 
The Diebold AccuVote machine is the system that we 
tested, and is in use in the State of Maryland.  It uses a 
touch screen (Figure 1) with a card reader that the voter 
gets after being authenticated by polling officials.  Detailed 
screen shots are shown Figures 4-6. 
  
Figure 1: Diebold AccuVote-TS system (left) and Hart 
InterCivc eSlate system (right) 
Hart InterCivic eSlate 
The Hart InterCivic eSlate (Figure 1) is a hardware-based 
voting device with no touch screen.  It displays the ballot in 
a page-at-once format (displaying multiple races on one 
page).  Voters navigate using triangle-shaped “prev” and 
“next” keys.  Voting itself is accomplished by rotating a 
dial labeled “select” until the desired candidate is 
highlighted.  To vote, the “enter” key is pressed.  After all 
votes have been entered, the user presses the red “cast 
ballot” key. 
SureVote 
The SureVote company provides a system that offers 
higher protection against malfunction or fraud (Figure 2). 
At voting time, users authenticate themselves and their 
right to vote using a numeric personal identification code 
and a numeric ballot code.  They then can enter a four-digit 
“vote code” for each race.  For example, a voter might 
enter “2304” to indicate a vote for George W. Bush for 
President.  An error message is presented if the entered 
code is invalid for that race.  If the code is valid, the vote is 
sent to multiple vote storage servers scattered across the 
country.  Each server sends back a numeric response, 
which is combined by the client into another four-digit 
code, the “sure code.”  If the voter’s sure code matches 
what is shown on his ballot, he can be certain that his vote 
was counted properly. 
While this system is technically interesting and may 
provide one mechanism whereby voters can have more 
confidence in the system, it raises usability issues.  
Requiring voters to enter and compare numbers is likely to 
be problematic for many users.  Even a change as minute as 
making the “vote code” and “sure code” have a different 
number of digits could decrease confusion. 
VoteHere Platinum 
VoteHere Platinum uses a completely software-based touch 
screen interface.  It can be run on any personal computer 
 Figure 2: SureVote DRE system 
 Figure 3: VoteHere Platinum system 
 
with a touch screen monitor.  However, this also means that 
the system does not offer hardware buttons or any of the 
benefits that hardware buttons provide.  In addition, it 
introduces new risks that the computer the software is 
running on may have been tampered with. 
The VoteHere system presents one race on the screen at a 
time; the voter presses the “next” and “back” buttons at the 
top of the screen to navigate between races (Figure 3).  
However, the number of pages is not indicated. 
RELATED WORK 
There is a long history of research in political science on 
the impact of procedural reform on elections, but very little 
within the HCI community.  Mercuri has been investigating 
a wide range of electronic voting issues for some time [19]. 
More generally, the political science community has 
focused on changes in the form of ballots and shifts in the 
administrative procedures for casting them.  Ballot reform 
was a frequent topic of papers and articles in the earliest 
days of the discipline—including prescriptions about 
excessive length and lack of uniformity, but also evidence 
of the effects of ballot design on roll-off and split-ticket 
voting [4][6].1  Fifty years later, there was a flurry of new 
studies on the relationship of ballot formats to roll-off and 
split-ticket voting.  Since then, there has been a small, but 
continuing series of studies on these effects along with the 
potential effects of candidate name order. 
These studies generally conclude that office-bloc ballots 
result in greater roll-off than party-column or party-row 
ballots [15 p. 212][30],2 but that the provision of straight-
party circles or levers tends to reduce roll-off, at least in 
partisan contests [22p. 109-110][25][30]. More recently, 
studies have shown that electronic voting machines result 
in less roll-off, presumably because they alert voters to 
whether they have completed the ballot [22, 23].  Studies 
have also shown the party-column ballot encourages 
straight-ticket voting in comparison to the office-bloc ballot 
[5][10 ch. 11][27]. 
Studies of ballot order effects often report that candidates 
listed first on the ballot are favored, at least in nonpartisan 
and non-salient elections [5][11, 17][20].  Bowler also 
found that ballot propositions were less favored the further 
down they appeared on the ballot [7].  
                                                           
1 Roll-off is the failure to cast votes for some offices on the 
ballot—usually offices below those at the top of the ballot 
or for ballot propositions. Split-ticket voting is the decision 
to cast votes for more than one political party.   
2 An office-bloc ballot lists candidates for each contest 
(e.g., governor) in a bloc. It is in contrast to the party-
column (or party row) ballot, which lists all candidates for 
a given party listed under a single, party heading.  Often, 
but not always, party-column ballots have a circle or other 
device that allows a voter, with one mark, to vote a straight 
ticket (i.e., for all members of the party). 
In the aftermath of the 2000 U.S. election, a number of 
studies evaluated various aspects of the Florida vote, 
somewhat altering the focus of investigation in the process.  
Analyses showed, for example, that there were many more 
“over votes” in Palm Beach County, where the butterfly 
ballot design was used [31].3  The U.S.  Commission on 
Civil Rights [29] concluded that poorer and minority 
communities more often utilized less modern equipment 
that is prone to over votes and other kinds of errors.  The 
Commission also noted a failure of the state to educate 
voters on the mechanics of voting. 
The largest post-2000 study was conducted by an 
interdisciplinary group of voting and computer specialists 
from the California Institute of Technology and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  The report from 
this group found, surprisingly, that “residual votes”4 were 
typically greater in jurisdictions using electronic voting 
than other kinds of machines (with the exception of punch 
cards), even when confounding factors were controlled [9].  
Kimball also found that electronic voting machines 
produced a slightly higher residual vote than optical scan 
ballots [16]. 
Only rarely have researchers considered whether or how 
ballot features might confuse voters.  In one noteworthy 
though very small-scale comparison, it was found that the 
labeling of rows on lever machines resulted in considerably 
different ballot order effects [5].  In another study, it was 
found that placing a salient race at the bottom of the ballot 
caused some voters not to cast a ballot—though a 
confusing straight-party device may also have contributed 
to this decline [12], especially as another study  found no 
such effect [8].  The fact that particular demographic 
groups, including the elderly, poor, and uneducated are 
more likely to cast incomplete ballots, also suggests the 
possibility of confusion, though indifference and lack of 
knowledge about the candidates might also explain these 
results [23][30][31].  The only experimental studies of the 
voting process, while very small scale, also revealed some 
confusion on the part of voters [26][28].  
Finally, the events surrounding the 2000 U.S. presidential 
election highlighted an aspect of voting that has not been 
dealt with since the introduction of the Australian (secret) 
ballot at the end of the 19th century—namely, that voting 
technology and ballot design affect how voters feel about 
their ability to exercise their right to vote and influence 
voters’ willingness to accept the legitimacy of the election 
results.  Thus, despite high quality research on turnout, roll-
off, split-ticket voting, and order effects, there is little 
information about how to reform voting technology and 
ballot design in ways that will develop, encourage, and 
                                                           
3 Over votes occur when individuals cast votes for more 
candidates than are to be elected for a given office. 
4 Residual votes were defined as ballots on which no 
presidential vote was counted. 
 
support perceptions of the voting process as an accurate 
and fair reflection of voters’ intentions. 
STUDY 
At the request of election officials from Allegany, 
Dorchester, Montgomery, and Prince George’s (Maryland) 
counties, we evaluated the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting 
system using three commonly used techniques: expert 
review, close-up observation, and field testing.5 The result 
of each technique points out specific difficulties with this 
system – and also indicates general issues that other voting 
system manufacturers should keep in mind.  We did not 
have the ability to design the ballot or change interface at 
all, and instead evaluated the system as it was given to us 
by the election officials.  Figures 4-6 show screen shots of 
the system we evaluated. 
Expert Review 
We first employed an expert review to analyze the DRE 
system with faculty and staff at the Human-Computer 
Interaction Lab at the University of Maryland.  Each person 
spent approximately one hour using the DRE system and 
independently reported their concerns and suggested 
solutions.  The standard and audio-only systems were 
evaluated independently.  We summarize here each 
problem area we found. 
Inconsistent Terminology/Labeling (5 reviewers). Several 
words were confusing, inconsistent, or didn’t match the 
instructions. 
Color usage (4 reviewers).  Several dark background colors 
resulted in poor contrast with the black text. 
Inserting/Removing card (4 reviewers).  It was difficult to 
insert the card and to know where to insert the card in the 
first place.  Confusion was compounded because there is a 
short delay before the machine reacts.  
Help / Instructions (4 reviewers).  The instructions are long 
and unclear, and no help button is visible during voting. 
Layout  (4 reviewers).  It wasn’t clear what the ballot will 
look like when the list of candidates is more than a column 
long or when names are exceptionally long.  The review 
screen may cause confusion because it is organized 
differently than voting screens. 
System information  shown (4 reviewers).  The startup 
screen showed system information irrelevant to voters. 
Glare on screen (3 reviewers).  Screen glare may cause 
problems in some polling places. 
Changes / Feedback (2 reviewers). Voters must unselect an 
existing vote prior to selecting another candidate. No 
warning is given for over voting.  
Poor graphics/design quality (2 reviewers).  The images 
are low resolution, the colors are strong, and there are too 
many font styles. 
Privacy (1 reviewer).  Others might be able to see one’s 
vote as it is being cast. 
Audio-only System 
1. Inappropriate Keypad Mapping (5 reviewers).  The 
keypad mapping is inconsistent and unusual, making it 
hard to remember which function uses which number.  
                                                           
5 The full report describing this study is available at 
www.cs.umd.edu/~bederson/voting. 
Figure 4: Diebold help page 
Figure 5: Diebold ballot casting page 
Figure 6: Diebold review page 
 
2. Audio Quality (5 reviewers).  Static, clicks, and delays 
make the audio segments difficult to understand. 
3. Review Ballot (3 reviewers).  There is no review of the 
ballot before casting it. 
4. Feedback (2 reviewers).  The buttons don't have any 
audio feedback when pressed.  No warning is given 
for over voting. 
5. Cast Ballot (2 reviewers).  Voters are forced to go 
through the entire ballot. 
6. Volume Control (1 reviewer).  The volume control 
doesn't indicate which way is loud or soft. 
Close Observation 
We then observed and videotaped non-experts responding 
to all aspects of the voting process, including inserting the 
ballot card, selecting the candidates, and casting their 
ballot. We employed the “think aloud” method. Finally, we 
had the voters fill out a questionnaire describing their 
reactions to the new voting system. For each participant, 
we measured how long it took them to vote from the time 
they walked up to the machine to the time they left it.  We 
also counted how many errors they made. 
For this part of the study, we observed 47 University of 
Maryland members, primarily students, but also some 
faculty and staff.  The election that was tested included five 
races and one question that was split between two screens. 
The average time to complete the ballot was 2 minutes and 
10 seconds.  All participants except one completed their 
vote successfully with one participant unable to figure how 
to write-in a candidate. 
The participants generally liked the DREs, rating their 
overall comfort 7.7 out of 9 (on a 1-9 scale where 9 
represented highest level of comfort).  They found the 
screen layouts and color more problematic (6.9 out of 9).   
Representative comments are mentioned here with our 
observations following: 
 Easy to use, straightforward 
 Excellent idea 
 Inserting card was very confusing. 
 Concerns about reliability 
 Colors are not well chosen. 
 Font size could be bigger. 
 Layout of the ballot was confusing. 
1. System Failure. We didn’t expect to measure the 
robustness of this system because of small number of 
subjects and machines. However, at the very start of the 
experiment, one of the two machines malfunctioned and 
was rendered unusable (it would not return the voter card). 
2. Card Insertion. Many participants had difficulty  
inserting the card, which begins the voting process. They 
expected the machine to accept the card as ATMs do. So, 
they put the card in the slot gently and waited for the 
machine to take it in. But this system requires the card to be 
inserted hard until it “clicks.” The card then becomes 
inaccessible until the ballot is cast and the card is ejected.  
3. Layout. Only a small number of subjects were concerned 
with the layout of the mock ballot, which in part reflects its 
lack of realism (being only two pages).  
4. Language Selection. There were two language options, 
English and Spanish, with English selected by default. The 
shape and layout of the buttons were not clear. So, most of 
the subjects touched the “English” button and then waited 
for the next screen. It often took several seconds for voters 
to recognize they also had to press the “Start” button. 
5. Under voting. The system provides a summary page 
once the voter has sequenced through the entire ballot. This 
page indicates via a distinct color the races in which a 
candidate has not been selected. However, if a multi-
candidate race was under voted (i.e., the full number of 
candidates were not selected), the race is not highlighted. It 
appears on the summary page as if a full set of candidates 
were selected.  
Field Study 
Finally, we designed a field study to be administered to a 
more representative group of individuals in a more natural 
setting. The study was designed to have three components: 
1) the observation and recording of information about 
individuals’ interactions with the new voting systems; 2) 
the administration of a questionnaire to record the voters’ 
assessments of the systems; and 3) the administration of 
parts 1 and 2 to a large heterogeneous group of voters, 
including some Spanish-speaking individuals who were to 
receive a Spanish language ballot and questionnaire. The 
study was implemented by election officials.   
Unfortunately, the field study had two major shortcomings. 
The election officials did not record information about 
individuals’ interactions with the voting machines, and they 
did not involve as large or heterogeneous population as 
would have been ideal.  The latter limitation was mainly 
due to the fact that the majority of participants – 365 – 
came from the wealthier Montgomery County, with only 50 
coming from Prince George’s County and none from the 
other counties. Thus we have no record of voters’ 
interactions with the voting machines, and we only have 
responses from a very narrow slice of the population of 
Maryland voters.  
The voters who participated in the study consist of 
individuals from a relatively affluent retirement 
community, four libraries, a shopping mall, and the lobby 
of the Prince George’s County Administration Building. 
Because they are mostly an economic and socially elite 
population group, whose levels of educational attainment, 
computer usage, and Internet usage are higher than the 
population of Maryland voters, the experiences these 
citizens had with the new voting system are not 
representative of those of Maryland voters in general.  
Virtually absent from the field test are the experiences of 
individuals in rural or farming communities, individuals 34 
 
years of age or younger (more than 60 percent of the 
participants were over 65 years of age), individuals who 
have not earned a high school diploma (over half had a 
degree from a four-year college and 32 percent had done 
some post-graduate work), members of most minority 
populations (Latinos, Asian Americans, Native Americans, 
and multiracial citizens each comprised less than 3 percent 
of the participants and African Americans accounted for 
only 8 percent), and individuals born outside the United 
States or whose native language is not English. Thus the 
results paint a probably overly favorable assessment of how 
Marylanders can be expected to respond to the new voting 
systems absent a major educational campaign. 
The same caveats about the simplicity of the ballot 
discussed above apply here, but it bears restating that the 
challenges that participants faced is lower than those voters 
are likely to encounter on election day. 
The questions in the field study used a scale of 1 to 9, 
where 1 represented a negative characteristic and 9 
represented a positive one. 
1) When asked to report their overall impressions about 
using the system (rated between difficult and easy-to-use), 
80 percent of the respondents reported the system was easy 
to use (rated 8 or 9), 10 percent reported it was moderately 
easy to use (rated 7), and the remaining 10 percent 
indicated it was anywhere from difficult to somewhat 
challenging to use (rated from 1 to 6). Although 10 percent 
seems a small portion, it is important to recall that this is an 
elite group, and 10 percent of Maryland’s voting age 
population equals roughly 383,000 voters. 
Despite the overall homogeneity of the sample, there was 
some variation of opinion among the respondents. 
Individuals who own a personal computer, use computers 
frequently, or live in a city or suburban area had more 
favorable overall impressions of the new voting system 
than did others. Women had more favorable impressions 
than did men. (Note: all of the comparisons reported here 
and below are statistically significant.) 
2) When asked to report whether they felt comfortable 
using the system (rated between low comfort and high 
comfort), 86 percent of the respondents reported they were 
comfortable using the system (rated 8 or 9), 7 percent 
reported they were moderately comfortable (rated 7), and 
the remaining 7 percent indicated they were anywhere from 
uncomfortable to somewhat comfortable using the system 
(rated from 1 to 6). Once again, women, individuals who 
own personal computers, use computers frequently, or live 
in a city or suburban area gave more favorable responses.  
3) When asked how easy it was to read the characters on 
the screen (rated between difficult and easy-to-read), 86 
percent of the respondents reported they it was easy to read 
the screen (rated 8 or 9), 8 percent reported they found the 
screen moderately easy to read (rated 7), and the remaining 
6 percent indicated they found the screen anywhere from 
hard to read to somewhat easy to (rated from 1 to 6). Older 
individuals and those with higher levels of education had 
more difficulty reading the characters on the screen, 
reflecting what is generally known about the eyesight of 
these groups. 
4) When asked to assess the terminology on the voting 
system’s screen (rated between ambiguous and precise), 
83 percent of the respondents reported that the terminology 
was precise (rated 8 or 9), 10 percent reported they found 
the screen moderately precise (rated 7), and the remaining 
7 percent indicated they found the screen anywhere from 
hard to somewhat easy to decipher (rated from 1 to 6). 
Individuals who use personal computers less frequently 
were most likely to find the terminology more ambiguous.  
5) When asked to report whether correcting mistakes was 
easy (rated between difficult and easy), 81 percent of the 
respondents reported the system was easy (rated 8 or 9), 11 
percent reported it was moderately easy (rated 7), and the 
remaining 8 percent indicated it was anywhere from 
difficult to somewhat challenging (rated from 1 to 6). 
Individuals who use computers frequently found it easier to 
correct mistakes than did others. 
6) When asked to report whether they trusted that the 
system recorded the votes they intended to cast (rated 
between did-not-trust and trust), 85 percent of the 
respondents reported they trusted the system (rated 8 or 9), 
7 percent reported they trusted the system moderately 
(rated 7), and the remaining 8 percent indicated they did 
not trust the system or only trusted it somewhat (rated from 
1 to 6). Individuals who use computers frequently reported 
having less trust in the new voting systems than did others. 
This result probably stems from their greater awareness of 
the limitations of computer technology, exposure to 
computer “crashes,” familiarity with viruses, and other 
challenges facing the computer industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Our efforts to understand electronic voting systems leave 
us optimistic, but concerned.  These systems have promise, 
but the bottom line is that about 10% of the voters we 
talked to had significant concerns.  While 90% satisfaction 
may be acceptable for some usability studies, we feel 
strongly that digital government initiatives in general, and 
voting systems in particular must have higher standards.  
With important national elections being decided by less 
than 1% of the voters, leaving 10% unconfident about their 
vote is a major problem. 
So, we suggest that electronic voting system designers 
reach out to the community of design and usability 
professionals that can help make these systems great for all 
users – which will increase voter confidence, and can in the 
end, have wide-reaching results. 
We encourage the election officials that are involved in 
purchasing these machines to make usability a priority.  Put 
pressure on vendors to meet existing usability guidelines, 
establish their own metrics, and perform tests with 
representative users to measure their success.  To that end, 
 
we are currently embarking on creating a simple protocol 
for non-experts to perform the kind of studies we described 
in this paper.   
Finally, as citizens and HCI professionals, we should all 
communicate with our local election officials to explain the 
importance of these issues, and offer our help. 
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